Counterterrorism in Saudi Arabia: New Approaches to Radical Threats by Rachael Rudolph

Author:Rachael Rudolph [Rudolph, Rachael]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Political Science, Terrorism
ISBN: 9781999878702
Google: rwNQEAAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 36927459
Publisher: I.B. Tauris
Published: 2017-12-30T00:00:00+00:00

III. Structural Matters

Policies for combating Al Qaeda financing must take into consideration the context of the core structure of Al Qaeda and its relationship to such structural variables as the operational, organisational and functional changes taking place within the larger network of the core structure and the way regional and local entities like the Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Anasr Al-Islam in the Gulf or Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) have evolved. The networked nature of Al Qaeda is important for understanding the complexity of its funding methods and the corresponding Saudi AML/CTF strategy.21 Funding of a network need not be consistent and transaction flows are, more often than not, decentralised. In brief when assessing the AML/CTF strategy vis-à-vis terrorist funding, it is important to understand the structural relationships between the Al Qaeda core and the different variables represented by its regional affiliates.

The factors examined in this section are broken down according to operational costs and structural capabilities. Structural capabilities are concerned with how the type of organisational or network structure impacts funding. Operational costs help to explain why financing is less important than some of the other types of AT/CT policies. Both the operational costs and structural capabilities impact the resources needed. The funding of the former is different from the financing of a group’s structural apparatus and/or a network. It has been widely recognised that small amounts of financial resources are required to carry out operations.22

The financial costs of mounting a terrorist operation are low in comparison to state counter-actions, let alone open warfare. The 9/11 operational costs for Al Qaeda have been assessed at only $500,000,23 while the Madrid bombings have been estimated to cost a mere $10,000, though the Spanish government placed the figure at $60,000.24 The 7 July 2005 UK attacks were estimated to have cost less than $8,000.25 Certainly, the state response to these non-state operations would in each case have to run into many millions of dollars. So the examples given here illustrate the cost differential of terrorist acts in relation to state and non-state actors. Those waging guerrilla and insurgency warfare are aware of this differential. The resort to terrorism after all, is not about militarily defeating a state opponent but more about a war of psychological attrition. Terrorist operations are designed in the full knowledge that the adversary has far greater military capabilities and economic resources. This is why, as was discussed in the previous chapter, military/security responses to terrorism are only minimally effective. Likewise, regulations limiting or interdicting financial transactions are only likely to slow rather than halt the planning of terrorist acts.

Structural factors will also impact operational costs. It matters whether an entity or non-state actor has the capabilities of a large network, organisation or just a small group. This is because the level of funding will differ, as will the method by which funds are collected. The funding structure is more decentralised for small groups than it is for networks and organisations. This is, in part, because the latter require stable and predictable sources of income.

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